OSIPP\u57fa\u5e79\u8b1b\u5ea7\u6559\u54e1\u306e2\u6708\u306e\u7814\u7a76\u696d\u7e3e\u3092\u3054\u7d39\u4ecb\u3057\u307e\u3059\u3002<\/p>\n
\u30fb\u5c0f\u539f\u7f8e\u7d00 \u5148\u751f\u3000\u3000\u30fb\u5c71\u4e0b\u62d3\u6717 \u5148\u751f <\/p>\n <\/p>\n Miki Kohara<\/strong>\uff08\u8ad6\u6587\uff09<\/p>\n Miki Kohara and Mao Nakayama, “The impact of childcare on maternal employment,” Pacific Economic Review,<\/em> December 2024, Vol.29, Issue 5, pp.542-566.\uff08\u67fb\u8aad\u3042\u308a\uff09 Abstract: This paper re\u2010examines the impact of childcare availability on maternal employment in Japan, focusing on the period when childcare centre availability increased dramatically due to government policies in the 2010s aimed at boosting women’s labour participation. We use data tracking mothers’ employment status after childbirth, merging administrative data on the availability of both standard and nonstandard childcare centres. This is linked to each respondent via location identifiers based on their residential city and the nearest train station. The findings first show that an increase in unlicensed\/nonstandard daycare availability significantly raised the proportion of mothers who return to work by the time the child reaches the age of three, particularly in areas with limited access to licensed\/standard centres. Secondly, the effects may vary depending on the services offered by the centres. The results suggest that nonstandard centres, often more conveniently located and offering varied services, better meet the needs of working mothers, leading to higher employment rates. This research emphasizes that government efforts to expand childcare options in the 2010s may play a crucial role in promoting maternal labour\u2010force participation in Japan.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Takuro Yamashita <\/strong>\uff08\u8ad6\u6587\uff09<\/p>\n Daniil Larionov, Hien Pham, Takuro Yamashita, Shuguang Zhu, “First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition”, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,<\/em>First published: 29 January 2025\uff08\u67fb\u8aad\u3042\u308a\uff09https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1111\/jems.12628<\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Abstract: We study mechanism design with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is one principal and four or more agents, who share a common prior belief over a set of payoff-relevant states. The principal proposes a mechanism to the agents, each of whom can then acquire information about the state by privately designing a signal device. As long as it is costless for each agent to acquire a signal that is independent of the state, there exists a mechanism that allows the principal to implement any social choice rule at zero information acquisition cost for the agents.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n
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\n\u30fb\u4e8c\u6749\u5065\u6597 \u5148\u751f\u3000\u3000\u30fb\u4e2d\u5d8b\u5553\u96c4 \u5148\u751f<\/strong><\/p>\n\n
\nhttps:\/\/doi.org\/10.1111\/1468-0106.12459<\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n
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