2025.8.5
OSIPP基幹講座教員の7月の研究業績をご紹介します。
・赤井伸郎 先生
・松林哲也 先生
・松島法明 先生
Nobuo Akai（論文）
Nobuo Akai, Takahiro Watanabe(2025) “Endogenous timing of decentralized leadership with heterogeneous spillovers”, Economics of Governance, Published: 26 June 2025 (査読あり)
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10101-025-00326-2
Abstract: This paper considers the decentralized leadership model of local government with heterogeneous spillovers. In this model, as in the traditional decentralized leadership model, central government determines interregional transfer policies ex post, but the timing of policymakings of local governments can be chosen, sequential or simultaneous. We aim to investigate the types of timing games that can plausibly emerge as a consequence of rational decision-making by local governments that maximizes regional welfare. In most cases of spillovers, we find that the simultaneous move game is realized because local governments choose to be a leader in timing selection, and social welfare of the simultaneous move game is higher than that of the sequential move game. This implies that the realized simultaneous move game is superior in terms of social welfare.
松林哲也（その他の記事）
「投票率アップ、世界の取り組みは？ カギは「コストとベネフィット」」『今さら聞けない世界』朝日新聞（2025年7月15日11:00オンライン）
「投票率アップ、取り組みの功罪は？」『今さら聞けない世界』朝日新聞（2025年7月20日朝刊）
https://www.asahi.com/articles/AST797V14T79UHBI027M.html
Noriaki Matsushima（Discussion Paper）
Qiuyu Lu, Noriaki Matsushima, Shiva Shekhar “Welfare implications of personalized pricing in competitive platform markets: The role of network effects”, OSIPP Discussion Paper: DP-2025-E-003, July 1, 2025
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/102073
Abstract: This study explores the welfare impact of personalized pricing for consumers in a duopolistic two-sided market, with consumers single-homing and developers affiliating with a platform according to their outside option. Personalized pricing, which is private in nature, cannot influence expectations regarding the network sizes, inducing the platforms to offer lower participation fees for developers. Those lower fees increase network benefits for consumers, allowing the platforms to exploit these benefits through personalized pricing. Personalized prices are higher when the network value for developers is high, benefiting competing platforms at the expense of consumers. These findings offer policy insights on personalized pricing.